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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION ARGUMENTS: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE TUSSMAN AND TENBROEK
DISTINCTION
RUSSELL PANNIERt*

INTRODUCTION

It is a commonplace of constitutional doctrine that the
United States Supreme Court distinguishes between equal protection and substantive due process arguments, and that it uses
the equal protection clause to evaluate the former and the due
process clauses to evaluate the latter.' There are at least two
reasons why it is important to understand how to properly
draw the line between these two classes of arguments.
One reason concerns the analysis and evaluation of the logical structure of legal discourse in general. 2 Legal discourse includes legal argument, which, in turn, is exemplified in
differing patterns of argument. Hence, the analysis and evaluation of legal discourse includes the analysis and evaluation of
the patterns of legal argument. Now, a necessary condition for
analyzing and evaluating patterns of legal argument is an ability to distinguish those patterns from one another. Equal protection and due process arguments are distinct patterns of
legal argument. Hence, achieving analytical clarity about the
distinction between these two categories of arguments is a step
toward achieving analytical clarity about the entire class of
legal arguments.
The second reason is relevant even for lawyers unconcerned
about the general project of understanding the logical struct Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. Professor Pannier received his A.B. from Olivet University in 1964, his M.A. from Harvard University in
1969, and his J.D. from the University of Minnesota in 1974.
* I wish to thank Professors David Prince and Michael Steenson for reading and
commenting upon an earlier draft of this article.
1. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
2. Important works concerning this general project are, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961);J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: ANINTRODUCTION TO
THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1980); N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND

LEGAL THEORY (1978).
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ture of legal discourse. Courts often distinguish equal protection from substantive due process arguments. Lawyers serving
as judges on these courts must understand the distinction in
order to fulfill their judicial obligation to intelligently interpret
the law. Lawyers representing the parties appearing in these
courts must understand the distinction in order to adequately
represent their clients' interests.
I shall propose a way of distinguishing equal protection from
substantive due process arguments, and shall use that proposal
to evaluate the method of drawing the line presupposed in the
classical analysis of Tussman and tenBroek.3 I shall conclude
with some brief illustrations of the Supreme Court's occasional
failure to properly distinguish the two forms of argument. 4
I.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMPARATIVE AND
NONCOMPARATIVE FAIRNESS

I suggest that the best way of drawing the distinction between equal protection and substantive due process arguments
is tying that distinction to the contrast between comparative
fairness and noncomparative fairness. Equal protection arguments are best understood as arguments which rely upon considerations of comparative fairness. Due process arguments
are best understood as arguments relying upon considerations
of noncomparative fairness. 5
The characteristic feature of a comparative fairness argument is a comparison between the ways in which someone
treats two or more other persons. Such an argument relies
upon a comparison between the way in which some actor, A,
treats a second person, B, on the one hand, and the way in
which A treats at least one other person, C.
For example, suppose that parent, A, comes home to dis3. That analysis is set out in Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
4. Although I shall focus upon the category of substantive due process arguments as the contrast to the category of equal protection arguments, most of what I
say could easily be translated to other contrasts, such as that between equal protection and procedural due process arguments, or that between equal protection and
free speech or contract clause arguments.
5. For an illuminating discussion of the distinction between comparative fairness and noncomparative fairness arguments, see Feinberg, NoncomparativeJustice,83
PHIL. REV. 297 (1974).
I do not intend to suggest that what I am calling "substantive due process arguments" exhaust the class of noncomparative fairness arguments. They clearly do not.
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cover that her children, B and C, have broken a vase while
playing soccer in the living room. A had warned B and C
about playing soccer in the living room. Suppose that A punishes B by withholding B's allowance for the next week, but
does nothing to C. Now, B could make, or someone could
make on his behalf, a comparative fairness argument. He
could say: "It may be alright to punish me for breaking the
vase, but if you punish me, you must punish C as well, because
C is just as guilty as I am." B's argument is a comparative fairness argument because it relies upon a comparison between
the way in which A is treating B, on the one hand, and the way
in which A is treating C, on the other. B claims that the unfairness of A's treatment of him can be grasped only by comparing
that treatment with A's treatment of C.
This is an example of an allocation of a burden. But, of
course, comparative fairness arguments can also be made in
response to allocations of benefits. Suppose that parent A
gives child B a Coke without giving one to child C. C could
make a comparative fairness argument based upon a comparison between the way in which A has treated B, on the one
hand, and the way in which A has treated C, on the other.
Thus, again we see that the characteristic feature of a comparative fairness argument is a reliance upon a comparison between the ways in which one actor has treated two or more
other persons.
What is the characteristic feature of noncomparative fairness
arguments? They rely upon an evaluation of the way in which
some actor, A, treats some other person, B, without relying
upon any consideration of the way in which A treats anyone
else. The proponent of a noncomparative fairness argument
claims that the actor's treatment of the proponent, or someone
whom the proponent represents, is unfair, and that this unfairness is ascertainable without consideration of the actor's methods of treating anyone else.
Impositions of burdens can raise questions of noncomparative, as well as comparative, fairness. Consider, for example,
the parent, A, who punishes her children, B and C, for playing
soccer in the living room by locking them in the garage for
three weeks. Despite the fact that she has treated both children in the same way, each child has a basis for alleging unfair
treatment. Each could argue that the punishment was disproportionate to the wrong. And each could make that argument
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
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without mentioning A's way of treating the other child. That
is, neither B nor C would have to rely upon any comparison
between the way in which A was treating B and the way in
which A was treating C.
Conferrals of benefits can also stimulate noncomparative
fairness arguments. Suppose that parent A gives child B a gift
of $100 for "being good," when, in fact, B has not been good
at all. Now, even though C may not have been good either, C
could complain about A's conferring the benefit upon B on the
ground that B did nothing to merit it. Like the previous argument, this one does not rely upon any comparison between the
way in which A is treating B and the way in which A is treating
C.
Of course, I do not mean to suggest that situations raising
issues of comparative fairness cannot also raise issues of
noncomparative fairness, and vice versa. Many situations trigger both kinds of issues. Consider, for example, the case in
which the children, B and C, have been playing soccer in the
living room, contrary to parent A's orders. A comes home and
punishes B by fining him $10,000 but lets C go without punishment. B would have both a comparative fairness argument (C
was not punished), and a noncomparative fairness argument
(the punishment was not proportionate to the wrong).
In summary, comparative fairness arguments rely upon a
comparison between the way in which some actor, A, treats a
second person, B, on the one hand, and the way in which A
treats at least one other person, C, on the other hand. In contrast, noncomparative fairness arguments rely solely upon a
consideration of the way in which some actor, A, treats a second person, B. 6
6. Peter Westen has argued that all equal protection arguments are reducible to
arguments concerning substantive rights, and that therefore the concept of equal
protection is "empty." See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1982). I do not think that he has demonstrated this, but even if he has, it would not
affect the project of distinguishing between equal protection and substantive due
process arguments. The mere fact that one form of argument is reducible to another
form, in the sense that any argument of the first form can be restated in terms of an
argument of the second form, does not show that the two forms are indistinguishable. Indeed, if we are unable to distinguish the two forms, there is no point in
claiming that one is reducible to the other. For example, it is well-known that the
inference pattern of Existential Instantiation is derivable as a derived rule of inference in standard systems for first-order quantification logic. But this fact does not
prove the absence of a distinction between arguments using Existential Instantiation
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The moral presupposition of noncomparative fairness arguments seems to be the principle that a human being has intrinsic worth and that justice requires that we recognize that worth
by treating that person as he or she deserves. The rights a person has in virtue of this principle are noncomparative rights.
Thus, the function of noncomparative fairness arguments is
the protection of noncomparative rights.
The moral presupposition of comparative fairness arguments seems to be the proposition that persons have equal degrees of intrinsic worth and should be treated as such in the
sense that differences of treatment must be consistent with the
principle of equal intrinsic worth. An additional moral presupposition is the principle that the maxim of equal protection is a
useful safeguard against our lack of omniscience when it comes
to knowing exactly what another person "truly deserves."
That is, in the absence of complete knowledge as to what treatment perfectly fits a person's just deserts, it is best to be constrained by the rule of equal treatment. Thus, one should treat
persons in the same way unless one is reasonably certain that
they deserve differing treatment. The rights a person has by
virtue of these principles are comparative rights. Thus, the
function of comparative fairness arguments is the protection of
comparative rights.
It seems that complete social justice could not be accomplished without complying with both the principle of comparative fairness and the principle of noncomparative fairness. It is
perhaps true that, assuming perfect knowledge and perfect
motivation, complying with the principle of noncomparative
fairness would suffice for justice. But, given our imperfect understanding and our imperfect motives, the principle of comparative fairness is useful protection against the risk of
misjudgment, bad faith, or both.
II.

THE TUSSMAN-TENBROEK ANALYSIS

Tussman and tenBroek claim that the essence of the principle of equal protection is the proposition that those who are
similarly situated should be treated similarly. 7 This principle,
in turn, is often expressed in terms of two more specific direcand those not using it. See, e.g., E. MENDELSON, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL
LOGIC, 64-67 (3d ed. 1987).
7. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 3, at 344.
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tives: (i) Treat similar cases similarly, and (ii) Treat dissimilar
8
cases dissimilarly.
What does it mean to treat similar cases similarly? What is
the criterion for determining which cases are similar and which
dissimilar? Tussman and tenBroek define the concept of "similarly situated" in terms of the objective of the particular law
being evaluated. As they put it, "A reasonable classification is
one which includes all who are similarly situated" with respect
to the purpose of the law. 9
They articulate the details in the following way. 10 The objective of a law may be either the elimination of some public evil
or the achievement of some public good. Because the analysis
is the same for both cases, we can safely focus upon the case of
eliminating a public evil. The defining characteristic of the legislative classification is the Trait. The Trait associated with any
particular law is the characteristic, or set of characteristics,
which something must have in order to belong to the class to
which the law applies. The Mischief is the evil which the legislature was trying to eliminate by means of that law. Thus, the
relation of a law's classification to the law's objective is identical to the relation of that law's associated Trait to its associated
Mischief.
The Trait and Mischief associated with any particular law determine two classes, the T-class and the M-class. The T-class is
the class of persons who possess the Trait. The M-class is the
class of persons who possess the Mischief. Given any particular law with its associated T-class and M-class, there are five
possible relationships between the two sets.
The case of perfect rationality exists when the T-class and
the M-class are identical. That is, when all members of the Tclass are also members of the M-class, and all members of the
M-class are members of the T-class, there is a perfect fit between the legislative purpose and the legislative classification.
Perfect irrationality exists when the T-class and the M-class
are distinct, i.e., when no members of the T-class belong to the
M-class. This is a case of perfect irrationality because there is
no relationship at all between the legislative purpose and the
legislative classification.
8. Westen, supra note 6, at 539-40.
9. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 3, at 345.
10. Id. at 346-53.
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The case of underinclusiveness exists when the T-class is a
proper subset of the M-class, that is, when all members of the
T-class belong to the M-class, but there are some members of
the M-class who do not belong to the T-class. In such cases
the legislative classification serves the legislative objective only
partially.
An overinclusive classification exists when the M-class is a
proper subset of the T-class, that is, when all members of the
M-class belong to the T-class, but there are some members of
the T-class who do not belong to the M-class. In such cases
the legislative classification burdens some who do not possess
the Mischief at which the law is aimed.
Finally, a classification which is simultaneously overinclusive
and underinclusive is one whose T-class includes persons who
do not belong to the M-class, and whose M-class includes persons who do not belong to the T-class. Such a classification
both fails to burden everyone who possesses the Mischief and
burdens some who do not possess the Mischief at all.' t
Tussman and tenBroek observe that examining the relationship between the associated T-class and the associated M-class
of a particular law does not exhaust all possible equal protection issues. 12 For, it is possible for a law to exemplify the case
of perfect rationality but nevertheless violate the equal protection guarantee because its objective is impermissible. For example, a legislature might impose a statutory burden upon a
racial minority out of a motive of racial enmity. The mere fact
that the classification might be neither underinclusive nor
overinclusive in terms of the legislative objective of imposing a
11. Tussman and tenBroek used the following diagrams to illustrate the five possible relationships between the class defined by the Trait and the class defined by the
Mischief:
(1)

0

(2)
(3)

: No T's are M's
\-V

(4)
(5)

: All T's are M's and all M's are T's

: All T's are M's but some M's are not T's
: All M's are T's but some T's are not M's

(?

: Some T's are M's; some T's are not M's; and some
M's are not T's

Id. at 347.
12. Id. at 353.
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special burden upon that particular minority would not save
the statute from invalidation under the equal protection
clause. Thus, equal protection concerns can be raised by the
very use of certain kinds of classifications.
What does all this come to for purposes of drawing a line
between equal protection and substantive due process arguments? The Tussman-tenBroek analysis seems to presuppose
the following picture. Every burden-imposing law imposes its
burden upon a certain class of persons. Hence, any burdenimposing law can be evaluated either by asking whether the
burden is fair or by asking whether the classification is fair.
Now, asking whether the burden is fair is a substantive due
process question. On the other hand, asking whether the classification is fair is an equal protection question. Asking
whether the classification drawn by a law is fair, in turn, resolves into asking whether the classification is underinclusive,
overinclusive or both. Hence, any argument alleging either the
underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness of a classification is an
equal protection argument.
III.

EVALUATION OF THE TUSSMAN-TENBROEK

METHOD OF

DRAWING THE LINE

The claim that arguments focusing upon classifications are
necessarily equal protection in nature seems most plausible
with respect to arguments alleging underinclusive classifications. Consider, for example, the ordinance challenged in
Railway Express Agency v. New York. 1 3 The ordinance prohibited
advertisements carried on vehicles, but exempted advertisements of products sold by the owner of the vehicle on which
the advertisements were carried. The stated objective of the
ordinance was the reduction of visual distractions to motorists
and pedestrians. It was argued that, while it might be fair in a
due process sense, to prohibit advertisements on vehicles, it
was not fair to do so unless all such advertisements were prohibited. Advertisements of products sold by the owners of the
vehicles on which those advertisements were carried presented
the same potential for visual distraction as advertisements of
products not sold by the owners of the vehicles on which the
advertisements were carried. This is a paradigm case of a com13. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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parative fairness argument. It relies upon a comparison between the way in which the government treats an owner of a
vehicle bearing an "unrelated" advertisement, on the one
hand, and the way in which the government treats the owner of
a vehicle bearing a "related" advertisement, on the other.
In general, arguments relying upon claims of underinclusiveness seem to be clear cases of comparative fairness, and
hence, equal protection arguments. For, such arguments depend upon contrasting the way in which members of the Tclass are treated with the treatment given to persons belonging
to the M-class but not to the T-class.
But matters are not so clear with respect to arguments relying upon claims of overinclusive classifications. Consider the
facts giving rise to the Japanese Evacuation Cases. 14 At the beginning of World War II United States military authorities believed that persons of Japanese ancestry living on the West
Coast posed a security threat. President Roosevelt issued an
executive order authorizing military commanders to be later
designated to define military areas from which any or all persons could be excluded. Roosevelt named General DeWitt as
Commander of the Western Defense Command. Acting pursuant to the executive order, DeWitt established a military
zone which included the Pacific Coast states. He issued several
orders applying to persons of Japanese ancestry living in the
zone. Some of these orders were exclusion orders which required such persons to leave their homes and move to relocation centers further inland.
One of the arguments made in the case was based upon the
overinclusiveness of the classification. Many Japanese Americans living in the military zone were not security threats at all,
but were loyal American citizens and aliens. Now, this argument does not seem to be based upon considerations of
comparative fairness. Rather, it seems to appeal to noncomparative fairness. Consider what a loyal Japanese American citizen or alien would say. "It may well be that some persons of
Japanese ancestry living in the military zone are security
threats to the United States. But I am not one of them.
Hence, it is unfair to detain me at all. If your purpose in detaining people is to protect yourself against acts of sabotage,
14. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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then it is unfair to detain me because I present no such threat."
No appeal is made to the way in which the government is treating anyone else. The claim rather is that the way in which the
government is treating the complainant is unfair in its own
terms, without regard to the government's treatment of others.
Thus, it seems clear that at least some arguments alleging
overinclusive classifications are arguments which appeal to
noncomparative, rather than comparative, fairness. It follows
that not all arguments which focus upon the nature of a law's
classification, as opposed to the nature of the law's burden, are
comparative fairness arguments. And if this is so, not all arguments which focus upon the nature of classifications are equal
protection arguments.
On the other hand, some arguments alleging overinclusive
classifications do seem to be genuine equal protection arguments. Consider, for example, a situation in which A engages
in some industrial activity which pollutes the air. Suppose that
B is also engaged in a polluting industrial activity and that the
level of pollution caused by B's operation is twice as much as
the level caused by A's operation. Suppose further that the
government imposes a pollution tax on A and B at the same
rate in each case. A could argue as follows, "I concede for the
sake of argument that it is fair in some sense to burden me with
a pollution tax, for I am polluting the environment. But it is
unfair to burden me with the same rate of tax you are applying
to B because B is causing twice as much pollution as I am. If
you are going to burden me at all, you ought to burden me to a
lesser extent than you burden B because B is causing a greater
amount of the harm you are trying to reduce." This argument
does appeal to comparative fairness. It makes the point that
the classification is overinclusive in that it treats certain persons as if they all cause the same kind and degree of public
harm, when not all of them do.
Thus, we have seen that some arguments alleging overinclusive classifications are noncomparative fairness, and hence due
process, arguments, while other arguments alleging overinclusive classifications are comparative fairness, and hence genuine
equal protection, arguments. Is there a way of defining the
distinction between these two classes? It seems that the
noncomparative fairness arguments are characterized by an allegation that the law's burden is imposed upon persons who
do not possess the Mischief at all. In such cases it is noncomhttp://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss3/3
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paratively unfair to bring such persons inside the T-class. On
the other hand, the comparative fairness arguments are characterized by an allegation that, while the burden has been imposed upon a person who possesses the Mischief, that person
does not possess the Mischief to the same degree as do other
persons who are burdened by the law to the same degree.
Thus, the M-class includes persons who possess the Mischief in
varying degrees. One might think of the M-class as having a
''core" containing persons possessing the Mischief to the
greatest degree and concentric rings surrounding the core,
each ring containing persons who possess the Mischief to a
lesser degree than persons contained in rings inside that ring
or in the core. A person located further toward the circumference of the M-class than another person could argue that it is
unfair to treat all the zones within the M-class in the same way.
So, while some arguments alleging overinclusive classifications are equal protection arguments, not all of them are. The
distinction between arguments which focus upon the nature of
a law's burden, on the one hand, and arguments which focus
upon the nature of a law's classification, on the other hand, is
not identical with the distinction between due process and
equal protection arguments. While it does seem that all arguments alleging underinclusive classifications are really equal
protection arguments, the category of arguments alleging
overinclusive classifications cuts across the category of equal
protection arguments.
It therefore seems that we ought to modify the underlying
picture of Tussman and tenBroek if we are to make it serve as
an adequate means of distinguishing between equal protection
and substantive due process arguments. I have argued that,
with respect to burden-imposing laws, that picture classifies arguments which focus upon the nature of the burdens as due
process arguments, and classifies arguments which focus upon
the nature of the classifications as equal protection arguments.
The picture needs correcting in at least the following ways.
One of the problems with the Tussman-tenBroek view is its
apparent assumption that every law either imposes a burden or
confers a benefit. As H.L.A. Hart has argued,' 5 this is probably not a very illuminating way of characterizing a legal system.
There are many instances of what Hart has called "secondary
15. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 2, at 77-120.
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rules," whose function is to prescribe conditions under which
persons can exercise certain kinds of powers, both public and
private. Such power-conferring rules seem to be neither burden-imposing nor benefit-conferring rules, but rather seem to
fall into a separate category altogether.
But let us put this point aside for the sake of argument and
concentrate upon clear cases of burden-imposing laws. It
seems that any such law must contain at least two parts or aspects. There must be some sort of description or specification
of the burden, and there must be some sort of description or
specification of the conditions under which the burden applies
to someone. Tussman and tenBroek use the word "classification" to refer to the latter aspect of a legal rule.' 6 Thus, that
aspect of a law which specifies the conditions under which the
burden specified by that rule is applicable is the law's
"classification."
Consider, for example, a statute which provides that any person convicted two or more times of grand larceny shall be subjected to compulsory sterilization. Suppose further that the
statute specifically exempts persons convicted two or more
times of embezzlement.' 7 That aspect of the law which specifies the punishment of sterilization is the specification of the
law's burden. And that aspect of the law which specifies the
conditions under which the burden is imposable is what Tussman and tenBroek call the law's "classification." It is by reference to the classification in this sense that one can determine,
with respect to any particular person, whether a law applies to
that person.
Is it possible to get clearer on the particular sense in which
Tussman and tenBroek use the word "classification?" There is
a sense in which one "classifies" something in referring to it as
an exemplification of some characteristic or universal rather
than another. For example, there is a sense in which I classify
when I say, "That black horse over there is eating the rhubarb
again." I have referred to the horse as an exemplification of
the characteristic of being a black horse over there, as opposed
to an exemplification of any of its other characteristics. I have
also referred to the rhubarb as "rhubarb" instead of any of its
16. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 3, at 344.
17. For the case upon which this hypothetical is modeled, see Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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other features. Thus, in one sense of "classify," one classifies
whenever one refers to anything at all, since to refer to something is to refer to it in certain ways rather than others, and
anything can be referred to in more than one way. Now, in this
sense of "classify," that aspect of a law which specifies the burden is just as much a classification as is any other part or aspect
of the rule. For, any legally imposed burden can be characterized in more than one way. Since Tussman and tenBroek
choose not to use the word "classification" in connection with
the specification of legally imposed burdens, it seems clear that
they do not mean to use the word in this first sense.
There is another sense of the word "classify" in which one
classifies whenever one refers to a proper subset of a larger set.
For example, if I say, "Yellow spinner baits are better lures for
largemouth bass than black spinner baits," I have classified in
this second sense in at least two ways. I have referred to the
class of yellow spinner baits, which, in turn, is a proper subset
of the larger class of spinner baits. And I have referred to the
class of largemouth bass, which, in turn, is a proper subset of
the larger class of bass. This second usage seems closer to the
sense Tussman and tenBroek have in mind, for they make the
point that any law which applies its burden to something less
than all persons in a jurisdiction classifies in their sense. Thus,
they say, "It is clear that the demand for equal protection cannot be a demand that laws apply universally to all persons.
The legislature, if it is to act at all, must impose special burdens upon or grant special benefits to special groups or classes
of individuals. We thus arrive at the point at which the demand for equality confronts the right to classify. For it is the
classification which determines the range of persons affected
by the special burden or benefit of a law which does not apply
to 'all persons.' "18

But although this second sense seems closer to the sense
Tussman and tenBroek have in mind, it is not identical to it.
For, it seems obvious that any specification of a legally imposed burden also classifies in this second sense. Any such
specification marks a particular class of burdens as a proper
subset of all possible legally imposed burdens.
Perhaps we can come closest to their meaning by saying that
by "classification" they mean any specification of the condi18. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 3, at 343-44.
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tions under which some legally imposed burden becomes applicable, where that specification entails that the burden is not
applicable to all persons at all times and in all situations.
Whether the word "classification" is the best possible word for
this sense is an open question.
Now, suppose that we evaluatively focus upon a law's specification of its burden, without regard to the classification conditions to which that burden is attached. It seems that in such a
case we could be raising only a noncomparative fairness issue.
We could be claiming only that the burden itself is intrinsically
unfair in the sense that it would be unjust to apply it to anyone
under any circumstances. Thus, for example, with respect to
our hypothetical sterilization statute, we might argue that the
burden of sterilization cannot ever be fairly applied to anyone.
We would, therefore, be making a substantive due process,
rather than an equal protection, argument.
But now imagine that we turn our evaluative focus upon a
law's classification conditions in Tussman and tenBroek's
sense. Here, we may or may not be raising equal protection
concerns. Whether we do depends upon the particular mode
of argument in each case.
For example, we might argue that the law's burden cannot
be fairly applied to persons satisfying the classification conditions, without regard to the government's treatment of any
other persons. With respect to the sterilization statute, we
might argue that it is inherently unfair to sterilize a person for
being convicted two or more times of the crime of grand larceny. Our point would be that, although the burden of sterilization might be fairly imposed upon some persons for having
committed certain other crimes, it cannot be fairly imposed
upon a thrice-convicted grand larcenist simply because the
punishment is disproportionate to the crime. Such an argument would be noncomparative in nature, and hence would be
a due process, rather than an equal protection, argument.
On the other hand, we might argue that the burden of sterilization cannot be fairly applied to a thrice-convicted grand larcenist because the government has failed to apply that burden
to thrice-convicted embezzlers, and that there is no significant
difference between the crime of grand larceny and that of embezzlement with respect to genetic transmission. This would
be a comparative fairness, and hence an equal protection, arhttp://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss3/3
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gument. For, it depends upon a comparison between the way
in which the government treats grand larcenists, on the one
hand, and the way in which it treats embezzlers, on the other.
What about arguments alleging overinclusiveness? As I
have argued, such arguments may or may not be equal protection arguments, depending upon their nature. Again, with respect to the sterilization statute, if we argue that, although it
may be fair to sterilize some criminals in order to prevent genetic transmission of criminal traits, it is unfair to sterilize
some particular defendant because her or his traits are not genetically transmissible (assuming that we had some argument
for this), we would be making a due process argument. For,
our claim would be that, given the state's objective of preventing genetic transmission of criminal tendencies, it is unfair to
apply the burden to this particular defendant because her or
his tendencies are not transmissible at all. On the other hand,
if we argue that the burden of sterilization cannot be fairly applied to some particular defendant because the state also applies that same burden to more serious felonies, then we are
making a comparative fairness argument. For, our claim here
would be that there are varying degrees to which persons included in the M-class class possess the Mischief, and that it is
unfair to apply the same degree of burden to all members of
the M-class.
In summary, arguments evaluating legal classifications are
not necessarily equal protection arguments. If they rely upon
considerations of noncomparative fairness, they are due process arguments. If they rely upon considerations of comparative fairness, they are equal protection arguments. In
particular, arguments alleging overinclusive classifications are
not necessarily equal protection arguments. The category of
arguments alleging overinclusive classifications has two subclasses, only one of whose members are genuine comparative
fairness arguments. There is no necessary connection between
the property of being an argument alleging an overinclusive
classification and the property of being an equal protection
argument.
IV.

THE LINE DRAWN BY THE COURT

At times the Supreme Court has drawn the line between
equal protection and due process arguments in terms fairly
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close to those I have proposed. For example, in Ross v. Moffitt,' 9 the Court said, " 'Due process' emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State,
regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may
be treated. 'Equal protection' on the other hand, emphasizes
disparity in treatment by a State between classes of individuals
whose situations are arguably indistinguishable."20 It is interesting that here the Court apparently ties the concept of an
equal protection argument to the concept of an argument alleging an underinclusive classification. For, it is only such classifications which trigger the maxim, "Treat similar cases
similarly."
But the Court has sometimes drawn the line differently. For
example, it has treated equal protection arguments as though
they were due process arguments. Consider Moore v. City of
East Cleveland,2 ' in which the Court applied a due process analysis to a housing ordinance limiting occupancy of a dwelling
unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined
"family" in such a way as to exclude a woman living together
with her son and her two grandsons, where the grandsons were
first cousins. The city sought to justify the ordinance as a
means of preventing overcrowding, reducing traffic and parking congestion, and reducing the financial burden on the
school system. In response to these purported objectives, the
Court said:
Although these are legitimate goals, the ordinance before
us serves them marginally at best. For example, the ordinance permits any family consisting only of husband, wife,
and unmarried children to live together, even if the family
contains a half-dozen licensed drivers, each with his or her
own car. At the same time it forbids an adult brother and
sister to share a household, even if both faithfully use public
transportation.

22

Now, the argument focusing upon a hypothetical family with a
half-dozen licensed drivers is a comparative fairness argument.
For, its point is that, given the objective of burdening persons
possessing the Mischief of contributing to traffic and parking
congestion, the T-class fails to include all those possessing the
19. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).

20. Id. at 609.
21.

431 U.S. 494 (1977).

22. Id. at 500.
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Mischief. The family with six licensed drivers possess the Mischief, but fall outside the T-class. The argument alleges an underinclusive classification and, as we have seen, is a paradigm
case of an equal protection argument. On the other hand, the
second argument does make a noncomparative fairness point.
The hypothetical family consisting of an adult brother and sister are included in the T-class but not in the M-class. They do
not possess the Mischief at which the ordinance is directed.
The argument based upon their situation makes a due process,
rather than an equal protection, point. Given the city's objective, it is simply unfair to burden them at all.
Note that, while the Court treated both of the foregoing arguments as due process arguments, Tussman and tenBroek
would have classified both as equal protection arguments because both focus upon the nature of a law's classification.
On the other hand, the Court has treated due process arguments as though they were equal protection arguments. Consider, for example, the Court's invalidation, under the equal
23
protection clause, of a marriage statute in Zablocki v. Redhail.
The statute provided that certain Wisconsin residents could
not marry without obtaining a court order authorizing the marriage. The class of residents was defined to include "any Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody and
which he is under an obligation to support by any court order
or judgment." 2 4 The statute also provided that court permission should not be granted unless the applicant submitted
proof of compliance with his support obligation and proved
that the children protected by the support order were not then,
nor were likely to become, public charges. The State put forward two objectives which it claimed supported the statute.
First, the required proceeding provided a chance to counsel
the applicant concerning the necessity of fulfilling his support
obligations. Second, the law protected the welfare of the outof-custody children. With respect to the second objective, the
Court said:
First, with respect to individuals who are unable to meet the
statutory requirements, the statute merely prevents the applicant from getting married, without delivering any money
at all into the hands of the applicant's prior children. More
23. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
24. Id. at.375.
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importantly, regardless of the applicant's ability or willingness to meet the statutory requirements, the State already
has numerous other means for exacting compliance with
support obligations, means that are at least as effective as
the instant statute's and yet do not impinge upon the right
25
to marry.
These two arguments are clear cases of noncomparative, and
hence due process, arguments. Their point is that, given the
State's objective, it is inherently unfair to impose the burden of
inability to marry upon these particular persons. Although it
might be fair to bar some persons from marrying, it is unfair to
bar these persons because, as applied to them, the prohibition
simply does not advance the objective at all. These arguments
do not rely upon any comparison between the way in which the
State treats the excluded applicants and the way in which it
treats anyone else. Hence, neither is an equal protection
argument.
In response to the argument that the welfare of out-of-custody children was protected by the statute in that it prevented
the marriage applicants from incurring new support obligations, the Court said,
But the challenged provisions ... are grossly underinclusive
with respect to this purpose, since they do not limit in any
way new financial commitments by the applicant other than
those arising out of the contemplated marriage. The statutory classification is substantially overinclusive as well:
Given the possibility that the new spouse will actually better
the applicant's financial situation, by contributing income
from a job or otherwise, the statute in many cases may prevent affected individuals from improving their ability to sat26
isfy their prior support obligations.
Now, the argument of underinclusiveness is a genuine case
of an equal protection argument. But, the second argument is
one of those arguments alleging overinclusiveness which is a
noncomparative fairness, and hence, due process argument.
For, its point is that, given the State's objective, it is noncomparatively unfair to burden persons who do not possess the
Mischief which the State is trying to prevent. There is no need
to rely upon any comparison with the State's treatment of
others. The Court here follows the automatic presumption of
25. Id. at 387.
26. Id. at 390.
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Tussman and tenBroek that any argument alleging an overin27
clusive classification is an equal protection argument.
CONCLUSION

I have proposed that the distinction between equal protection and substantive due process arguments be drawn by tying
it to the distinction between comparative fairness and noncomparative fairness arguments. I have argued that the method of
distinguishing the two categories of arguments presupposed in
the equal protection analysis of Tussman and tenBroek is inadequate, and I have suggested a way of modifying their analysis
to make it more adequate. Finally, I have argued that,
although the Supreme Court has sometimes drawn the line
close to mine, it has not always done so.
27. For an interesting explanation of why the Court does this, see Cohen, Is
Equal Protection Like Oakland? Equality as a Surrogatefor Other Rights, 59 TUL. L. REv.
884 (1985).
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